
I'm sitting in a plane looking out the window. It's a short two hour flight, but I feel like I've been locked in a coffin for two days. I try to read but can't focus. I would listen to music on my iPod but this is 1995 and they don't exist. Why is time dragging?? Because I'm on my way from Cincinnati to Montgomery, Alabama to face the president of a company who bought our new machining center, the Maxim, AND IT DOESN'T WORK.
The Maxim was part of our Wolfpack program at Cincinnati
Milacron and was a Dream Machine. Faster, smaller footprint, innovative design
features; it was a true next generation machining center that allowed us to
take the fight to our Japanese and European competitors. But like a runway
model with cancer it looked great on the outside but was dying on the inside.
The project had been giving top priority by our leadership
with one major hurdle. Manufacturing costs had to be reduced by 40% from the
cost of the current product, the T-10. The design and build of the machine was
done at our S. Carolina facility in Fountain Inn. The team was identified; the
project started and almost immediately the team made a fatal decision. The
manufacturing group at Fountain Inn was 1) "too busy" with building and
shipping the current product lines and wouldn't make itself available to the
Maxim design team and 2) didn't like some design ideas that the Maxim engineers
had come up with. Rather than resolve these "Design for Manufacturing &
Assembly" (DFMA) issues the project team backed off and had the first two
prototypes completely sourced and assembled outside the plant.
Once the two prototypes were built they made their second
fatal mistake, they began selling the new product line using the prototypes as
showroom demonstration models. When you have the history and reputation of
Cincinnati Milacron customers expect a product that has been thoroughly tested.
This was not the case with the Maxim.
As we began selling the machines the cost numbers started
coming in. The team had not achieved the targeted 40% reduction in
manufacturing cost and now it was time to throw the design over the wall to the
manufacturing team. As production ramped up guess what? Costs went up,
schedules slipped and testing was compromised. The project leader was fired.
How do I know all this? I was appointed business unit manager
and inherited the Maxim product line. That's why I'm on this plane to
Montgomery.
The meeting started amicably, true Southern hospitality was
on display. But as the meeting went on it became clear that the president,
Rick, wanted to return the two machines he had purchased for $800,000 and get
all his money back. Back in Cincinnati I was under tremendous financial
pressure because we had dozens of situations like this one and were spending
millions of dollars to engineer fixes and then send field service people into
the factories with the newly designed and manufactured parts.
"When I build a bad product I make it right with my
customers, why won't you do the same for me?" Rick pleaded.
"We'll send in a service rep and new parts to get you up and
running," I replied.
"Mark, your folks have been in twice before with the same
line of bull and the machines still don't work. I'm losing hundreds of
thousands of dollars on extra work, late shipments and now lost orders."
"Sorry Rick, I can't take the machines back and refund your
money."
"Then get the hell out of my plant!" So much for that
Southern hospitality.
Eventually we got the machines up and running, but then Rick
sold both of them and replaced them with a competitor's machines. He also
became a strong negative referral and was used by our competitors to scare away
potential customers.
We had closed the Fountain Inn plant and brought the product
line to Cincinnati. We were still trying to fix the major problem on the
machine - the tool exchanger system. It came to a point where I had to make two
major moves.
First, I went to a different business unit within Milacron
and recruited a team of engineers that knew nothing about the Maxim or its tool
changer system and put them in charge of the product. It was a bit amazing but
within the first week on the job they analyzed the system, identified the weak
link (a retention device) and came up with a newly designed part that cost
about $5.00!
The second move was to elevate the testing level to insure
this new design would work along with raising the overall reliability of the
machine. To do that I recruited the most stubborn, ornery project manager we
had in the company and put him in charge of quality. Machines only shipped if
Wayne said so. He immediately put in a testing program twice as rigorous as the
previous one. It resulted in one of the most "Alice in Wonderland"
conversations of my career. Here is how that conversation went:
The head of our assembly floor (I'll call him Mel) came to me
after Wayne put in the new test program.
"Mark, you've got a put a stop to Wayne and that testing
program."
"Why?"
"None of the machines are passing the tests. My workers are
having to rework the machines over and over and then those heavy test tools he
is using are falling out of the machines. They are a safety concern."
"Isn't all the testing within the specifications of the
machine? Aren't these tests exposing the weak links in our quality and
reliability?"
"Yes, but my departmental overtime is up, I'll miss my budget
and look bad for missing ship dates."
"So Mel, you're telling me it's OK for machines to break down
or 50 lb. tools to get thrown across the room as long it's on our customer's
floor not yours because your guys won't get hurt and you'll make your
performance targets?"
He didn't reply as I stared at him. The next day I had a new assembly
floor manager.
The new design did work and after months and months of hard
work at the plant and in the field we were able to make the vast majority of
our customers whole.
Lesson #3 - In this era of innovation and creativity
and breakthrough products never, never, never short change testing and always,
always, always empathize with your customer first.
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